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Abstract
Family disputes over a loved one’s funeral arrangements are increasingly frequent, 
with courts intervening if consensus cannot be reached. In many common law 
jurisdictions, the law favours the executor where the deceased made a will and the 
highest ranking next-of-kin where the deceased died intestate. But what if two or 
more people fall within the same kinship tier and have equal rights to determine the 
deceased’s fate—who has the final say? Adopting a uniquely comparative approach 
which draws the authorities together for the first time, this article analyses the fac-
tors devised by judges in Australia and England, and contrasts them with the dis-
crete statutory tests adopted in parts of Canada and the United States. Having evalu-
ated the various approaches, the article proposes its own hybrid legal solution for 
breaking the deadlock in so-called ‘equal kinship disputes’.
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Introduction
In November 2015, Susanna Levrant and David Freud asked the High Court in Lon-
don to rule on which of them should decide their dead mother’s funeral arrange-
ments.1 Mrs Levrant wanted a traditional Church of England ceremony, then burial 
in a Putney cemetery; Mr Freud insisted on a traditional Jewish funeral followed 
by interment in consecrated ground in north London.2 Three days later, the siblings 
 * Heather Conway 
 h.conway@qub.ac.uk
1 School of Law, Main Site Tower, Queen’s University, Belfast BT7 1NN, UK
1 “Siblings in High Court Battle Over Whether Mother Should be Buried in Jewish or Christian Cere-
mony”, The Telegraph (London, 6 November 2015) <http://www.teleg raph.co.uk/news/uknew s/law-and-
order /11980 060/Sibli ngs-in-High-court -battl e-over-wheth er-mothe r-shoul d-be-burie d-in-Jewis h-or-Chris 
tian-cerem ony.html>.
2 The deceased had been baptised and brought up as a member of the Church of England; her husband 
(who predeceased her) had been a practising Jew.
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compromised: their mother’s funeral would be conducted under the neutral auspices 
of the Master of the Inner Temple Church, before burial in consecrated ground in 
another Putney cemetery.3 In August 2016, the High Court in Northern Ireland faced 
a similar scenario, when separated parents fought over their adult son who had died 
from a suspected heart attack, the mother insisting on burial and the father on cre-
mation.4 The following day, the court released the deceased’s remains to his father, 
after the mother—reluctant to put the family through a contested hearing—aban-
doned her claim.5 And despite all the media hype, it is important to see the 2016 
ruling on whether a 14-year-old girl could be cryogenically preserved in a specialist 
facility in Michigan for what it actually is: divorced parents fighting over whether or 
not this should happen.6
Disputes within families over a loved one’s funeral arrangements occur more 
often than we might think. They are also increasing as the re-ordering of traditional 
family networks alongside the emergence of multi-faith, multi-ethnic societies with 
diverse death rites and customs create new tensions around the fate of the dead.7 
Where consensus or compromise cannot be reached, an effective legal mechanism 
is needed to break the deadlock and ensure that bodily disposal takes place,8 or that 
post-cremation ashes are dispersed or otherwise dealt with.9 English law, like many 
common law jurisdictions, contemplates a clear order of entitlement based on suc-
cession law principles.10 The first point to note is that the deceased’s own funeral 
preferences are not legally binding.11 Instead, where the deceased made a will the 
final say lies with the executor.12 For intestate deaths (which occur frequently, both 
5 The father had to keep half of the deceased’s ashes for the mother—see “Belfast High Court: Father 
Wins Right to have Son Cremated”, BBC News Online (27 August 2016) < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
uk-north ern-irela nd-34076 152>.
6 Re JS (Disposal of Body) [2016] EWHC 2859 (Fam). While the court ruled for the mother, it was the 
cryonics aspect that attracted headlines—see e.g. “Terminally Ill Teenager with Rare Form of Cancer 
Wins Landmark High Court Battle to be Cryogenically Frozen”, The Independent (London, 18 Novem-
ber 2016) <http://www.indep enden t.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/cryog enica lly-froze n-teena ger-termi nally 
-ill-cance r-a7424 036.html>.
7 Conway (2016), ch 4.
8 ‘Disposal’ may seem clinical, but denotes treating human remains in a way which eliminates the public 
health risk while physically segregating the dead from the living. Burial and cremation remain the two 
dominant options.
9 Families fighting over ashes is very common. Although the same legal rules apply in determining who 
has the final say (Robinson v Pinegrove Memorial Park Ltd (1986) 7 BPR 15 097), the fact that ashes can 
be scattered, retained, and dealt with in different ways raises a host of issues—see the respective discus-
sions in Leeburn v Derndorfer [2004] VSC 172 and Doherty v Doherty [2007] Qd R 259.
10 Conway (2016), pp 61–67.
11 Williams v Williams (1882) 20 Ch D 659.
12 Williams v Williams (1882) 20 Ch D 659 and Grandison v Nembhard [1989] 4 BMLR 140.
3 “Siblings Compromise Over Mother’s Burial”, The Times (London, 9 November 2015) <http://www.
theti mes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/artic le460 9492.ece>.
4 “Belfast High Court: Parents Ask Judge to Decide Funeral Arrangements”, BBC News Online (26 
August 2016) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-north ern-irela nd-34064 905>. Both parents believed they 
would be fulfilling their son’s wishes.
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here and elsewhere),13 the decision lies with the highest ranking next-of-kin as 
defined by the list of potential estate administrators. Much depends on the relevant 
intestacy framework, but in most instances a surviving spouse or civil partner takes 
priority, followed by the deceased’s children, then parents, then sisters or brothers.14 
Delineating rights by a descending order of relational ties means, for example, that 
courts will favour a husband or wife over the deceased’s parents or siblings where 
the two sides clash over funeral arrangements.15 But if, as in the opening examples, 
the disagreement involves persons within the same kinship tier with equal rights to 
determine the deceased’s fate, these rules offer no solution and an alternative has to 
be found.16
Ranking competing claims when the protagonists have the same legal and famil-
ial affiliations to the deceased raises all sorts of issues which have been largely over-
looked in academic literature.17 This is surprising—not just because of a spate of 
high-profile contests, but given the significant volume of case law from courts in 
England and Australia in particular. Meanwhile, other jurisdictions have developed 
their own legislative solutions, which also tend to be ignored or looked at in iso-
lation. Adopting a uniquely comparative approach, this article draws the disparate 
strands of jurisprudence together for the first time, and examines the fundamentally 
different ways in which specific common law jurisdictions with similar socio-cul-
tural attitudes towards death resolve so-called ‘equal kinship disputes’.
Initially, the focus is on England and Australia where the problems caused by 
the lack of a clear legal rule have been exposed repeatedly. Here, judges have had 
to proceed from first principles, creating an improvised jurisprudence. The article 
goes on to examine legislative provisions in parts of Canada and the United States of 
America which apply specific rankings; these range from favouring the eldest pro-
tagonist at one extreme, to more emotive notions of who was closest to the deceased 
at the other. Focusing on these frameworks, and drawing on aspects of succession 
and family law, as well as the fields of ‘death studies’ and law and emotion, the arti-
cle questions whether such subjective value-judgments are a good idea, or whether 
an objective ranking is better for all concerned. It concludes by proposing its own 
hybrid solution, creating a distinctive statutory mechanism for resolving equal kin-
ship disputes.
13 The English Law Commission estimates that 40% of adults in England and Wales have not made a 
will (Law Commission (2017), p 5), though the figure could be high as two-thirds.
14 In England and Wales, see s 46 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925 (as amended).
15 See e.g. Saleh v Reichert (1993) 104 DLR (4th) 384 (deceased’s husband outranked her father) and 
Threlfall v Threlfall [2009] VSC 283 (coroner erred in releasing the deceased’s body to his brother 
instead of his widow).
16 Similar issues arise where joint executors under a will disagree over funeral arrangements, though this 
occurs less frequently. For an isolated example see Leeburn v Derndorfer [2004] VSC 172 where sib-
lings who were joint executors under their dead father’s will clashed over his ashes.
17 There is a short comment Freckelton (2009) and the matter is mentioned briefly in Conway (2016), pp 
95–97.
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Legal Deficits and Limitations
Equal kinship disputes occur in two classic situations: siblings fighting over a dead 
parent,18 and parents quarrelling over a dead child after their own relationship 
has broken down. Siblings fighting over another dead sibling is also a possibility, 
where the brother or sister died without legally closer kin (in other words, leaving 
no spouse/civil partner, children or surviving parents). Yet, the first two scenarios 
are much more common, and are some of the most bitter and contested conflicts. 
Divorced or separated parents will often embark on one final and decisive custody 
dispute19 following the death of a child; this is often an infant or minor child,20 but 
can also be an adult son or daughter who dies without without leaving a spouse or 
civil partner, or children of their own. Sibling strife is just as commonplace, not just 
within reconstituted families where the deceased’s children from different relation-
ships vie for priority, but intact families where (old) sibling rivalries are triggered by 
parental loss and the resultant emotional maelstrom.21
Such unresolved family tensions make consensus difficult to achieve, forcing 
courts to choose a particular parent or sibling and end the impasse.22 This is not a 
task that judges relish. First, decisions must be reached within a compressed time-
frame, and not just because decaying corpses pose a public health risk.23 The core 
societal value of respect for the dead mandates a quick resolution: storing corpses 
or ashes while discordant relatives litigate their fate in protracted legal disputes 
offends some basic sense of social mores.24 Secondly, equal kinship disputes (for the 
most part) lack a discrete legal solution. While these might seem like a family law 
issue, funeral disputes are resolved by succession law rules; yet, these are ineffective 
here, since intestacy laws do not distinguish between individuals within the same 
18 In most cases, this will be the deceased’s biological or adoptive children, since step-children have 
lesser rights. The position will be different in Scotland when s 65 of the Burial and Cremation Act (Scot-
land) 2016 takes effect (deceased’s adult child(ren) can decide his/her funeral arrangements; stepchild to 
be treated as a child of the deceased).
19 While English family law no longer uses the term ‘custody’ (s 8 of the Children Act 1989 deals with 
‘residence’ and ‘contact’ under “child arrangement orders”), this particular terminology will be used for 
convenience throughout.
20 Intestacy-based principles may seem irrelevant, because a child usually has no estate to administer. 
However, both parents would be entitled to a grant of administration if there was one (in England and 
Wales, see the Non-Contentious Probate Rules 1987, SI 1987/2024, r 22(1)(c)), creating joint rights to 
decide their child’s funeral arrangements—Scotching v Birch [2008] EWHC 844 (Ch).
21 See e.g. Milevsky (2013).
22 A negotiated solution is always preferable to litigating to the finish, and funeral disputes are no excep-
tion. Mediation has a role to play (see Josias (2004) and Oldfield (2014)), but does not always succeed. 
Time constraints (see immediately below) and damaged family relationships act as barriers, though there 
is also the fact that the overriding aim here is to ensure that corpses or ashes are dealt with (not capacity 
building processes which foster functional relationships within families—the ‘holy grail’ of family law 
mediation).
23 Though this danger is more apparent than real, since there is no scientific (or legal) barrier to refrig-
erating corpses, to facilitate a full hearing and subsequent judicial deliberation. Of course, ashes pose no 
threat to public health.
24 Sentiments reflected in some of the judgments on family funeral disputes—see Conway and Stannard 
(2011), pp 886–891.
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relational class. Ancillary rules for administering estates if joint personal repre-
sentatives disagree offer no comparable solutions25 and, unlike inheritance contests 
where courts can appease warring relatives by dividing assets, a similar option is not 
available unless the deceased has been cremated and splitting the ashes is an accept-
able compromise.26 In England and Wales, limited assistance can be found in s 116 
of the Senior Courts Act 1981 which allows the High Court to appoint a different 
administrator (or executor) if “special circumstances” make it “necessary or expedi-
ent” to do so.27 Yet, while applicable in equal kinship disputes,28 the legislation is 
silent on what constitutes ‘special circumstances’ for substituting one individual for 
the other(s), leaving judges to draw their own conclusions on the facts. And recourse 
to the court’s inherent jurisdiction, as a procedural alternative,29 presents exactly the 
same problem.
In short, when faced with equal kinship disputes, English courts have had to 
develop specific ways of prioritising one parent or sibling over the other(s). This 
experience is not unique, with courts in Australia facing the same problem (again, 
there is no legislative guidance, beyond the basic intestacy rules).30 A distinct body 
of case law has emerged in both jurisdictions; detailed analysis reveals a mixture of 
commonalities and contradictions, as the following sections show.
Common Law Tie‑Breakers: England and Australia
While both the factual narratives and outcomes differ (as we might expect), several 
broad themes have emerged from the case law.
25 In England and Wales, r 27 of the Non-Contentious Probate Rules 1987, SI 1987/2024 favours a per-
son of full age in preference to a guardian of a minor, and a living person over the personal representative 
of a deceased person (r 27(5)), but otherwise leaves the matter to the court (rr 27(6)-(8)). However, the 
usual practice is to select the individual who is best placed to administer the estate (Re Loveday [1900] P 
154), or with the largest interest in it (Dampier v Colson (1812) 2 Phill 54).
26 This must be acceptable to all of the equally ranked kin, and is not an option where one party 
objects—see Fessi v Whitmore [1999] 1 FLR 767 (discussed at nn 42–44 and accompanying text). Of 
course, there is no prospect of carving up a corpse in this manner—described as “unthinkable” by Byrne 
J in Leeburn v Derndorfer [2004] VSC 172 at [31]. Public health and the core value of respect for the 
dead would prevail, even if the protagonists favoured such a macabre compromise.
27 1981 Act, s 116(1). Although more commonly concerned with estate management, disposal of the 
dead also falls within its ambit—see e.g. Buchanan v Milton [1999] 2 FLR 844 and Burrows v HM Coro-
ner for Preston [2008] EWHC 1387 (Admin).
28 According to Peter Jackson J in Re JS (Disposal of Body) [2016] EWHC 2859 (Fam), though in 
Anstey v Mundle [2016] EWHC 1073 (Ch) (decided some nine months earlier) Klein J was less con-
vinced that s 116 was engaged in a sibling dispute over parental remains.
29 Preferred in both Hartshorne v Gardner [2008] EWHC B3 (Ch) and Anstey v Mundle [2016] EWHC 
1073 (Ch), and the procedural mechanism used in most of the Australian cases cited in the following sec-
tion.
30 The same applies in Northern Ireland (as the opening example illustrates), and in New Zealand and 
the various Canadian provinces with the exception of those noted in the section entitled ‘Statutory Rules 
for Breaking the Deadlock’ below though the volume of reported case law from these jurisdictions is 
lower.
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Expediting the Funeral
Where the body has yet to be buried or cremated, ensuring that this occurs as quickly 
as possible is crucial for reasons already identified. Expediting the funeral was sin-
gled out as “the most important consideration” in the English case of Hartshorne v 
Gardner31—sentiments repeated almost a decade later in Anstey v Mundle.32 This 
particular factor proved decisive in two Australian cases.
In Calma v Sesar,33 separated parents fought over their adult son. The mother 
had arranged for a Catholic burial in Darwin; the father preferred the family plot 
near Port Hedland, Western Australia. Martin J emphasised that lifetime quality 
of parenting was irrelevant, and refused to be influenced by religious and cultural 
factors or other “imponderables”34 despite both parents and the deceased being of 
Aboriginal descent. Stressing the need for the matter to be resolved “in a practical 
way…[and] without unreasonable delay”,35 Martin J gave custody of the body to the 
mother as it was already in Darwin (albeit with a funeral director instructed by the 
father—this was irrelevant, as was the fact that the mother had already applied for a 
grant of administration over her son’s estate). There was “no good reason in law”36 
for preferring Port Hedland, some 2000 km away.
Substantively similar issues arose a decade later when divorced spouses clashed 
in Burrows v Cramley,37 the mother wanting to bury her 17-year-old son in Perth 
and the father favouring Sydney. Pullin J acknowledged that mother and son had 
ceased contact for several months before his death, and that the father (as custodial 
parent) almost certainly “provided the greater care”38 for his son. Once again, these 
were extraneous considerations:
[E]vidence about where the deceased lived and why is relevant, but…detailed 
evidence about who, out of two parents, provided the most [sic.] support and 
comfort, is not relevant to the decision I have to make.39
Drawing on comments in Smith v Tamworth City Council40 that “the practicalities of 
burial without unreasonable delay” were paramount, Pullin J ruled for the mother. 
The son had died in Western Australia and burial in Perth would be more practical; 
the father was currently in Perth, and was better placed financially to visit his son’s 
31 [2008] EWHC B3 (Ch) at [9].
32 [2016] EWHC 1073 (Ch). Both cases are mentioned further in the discussion below.
33 (1992) 106 FLR 446.
34 (1992) 106 FLR 446 at 452.
35 (1992) 106 FLR 446 at 452.
36 (1992) 106 FLR 446 at 452. See also Joseph v Dunne [2007] WASC 238 (eight-year-old’s body 
released to his father, partly because he had arranged a funeral for the following day).
37 [2002] WASC 47.
38 [2002] WASC 47 at [32].
39 [2002] WASC 47 at [32].
40 (1997) 41 NSWLR 680 at 694 (Young J).
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grave. His offer to pay for the mother to visit the grave regularly did not sway the 
final decision.41
Detachment from the Place of Death
In sudden or violent deaths, English courts have occasionally favoured the person who 
wants the deceased laid to rest, away from the scene of the tragedy. A good illustration 
is Fessi v Whitmore42 in which a divorced couple fought over their 12-year-old son’s 
ashes. The boy lived with his father in Nuneaton (where the entire family had always 
lived), until a few weeks before his death when father and son had moved to Wales, and 
the boy had been buried in sand while playing on a beach. The mother wanted to scat-
ter the ashes in Nuneaton; the father wanted to inter them near his new home. Splitting 
the ashes was “wholly inappropriate”43 because the father objected, forcing the judge 
to choose between the parties. Circumstances favoured the mother: the father’s prefer-
ence would cause “enormous distress”44 to the family (being so close to the scene of the 
accident), whereas Nuneaton was a more fitting focal point for everyone. Like Burrows 
v Cramley,45 the fact that the father was the custodial parent was irrelevant.
In Scotching v Birch,46 the dispute was also between the separated parents of a 
dead 5-year-old boy. The mother had killed the child and attempted suicide after-
wards, following a court hearing to discuss contact arrangements with his father. She 
had pleaded guilty to unlawful killing, but was in prison awaiting trial for murder, and 
wanted to bury her son in the graveyard of the church where her other three children 
were christened; this was near the family home and scene of death. The father did not 
want his son interred there, preferring a grave close to where the father lived. Invok-
ing the forfeiture rule to deny the mother’s notional right as administrator of her son’s 
estate—public policy decrees that someone who is criminally responsible for anoth-
er’s death cannot inherit from them—the court ruled for the father. This was despite 
the father having had virtually no contact with his son for several years, and the 
deceased’s half-siblings siding with their mother (all three were minors, but wanted 
to be able to visit their brother’s grave and maintain strong sibling attachments).
Affective Place Connections
Another way of analysing Fessi v Whitmore47 is that the deceased’s emotional and 
geographical ties to a particular place are important—hence the court’s decision to 
give the ashes to his mother, to be scattered where the family had lived together 
41 In Joseph v Dunne [2007] WASC 238 (see n 36), the fact that the mother could probably not afford 
visits to her son’s grave was relevant but not persuasive.
42 [1999] 1 FLR 767.
43 [1997] 1 FLR 767 at 770.
44 [1997] 1 FLR 767 at 770.
45 [2002] WASC 47.
46 [2008] EWHC 844 (Ch).
47 [1999] 1 FLR 767.
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in happier times.48 Substantively similar reasoning can be seen in Hartshorne v 
Gardner,49 when divorced parents fought over their 44-year-old son’s remains (the 
mother favoured cremation and interment of the ashes in Worcester where she lived; 
the father wanted burial some 40 miles away in Kington). In listing relevant factors, 
the deputy judge included “the location with which the deceased was most closely 
connected”.50 On the facts, this was Kington: the deceased had lived in the town for 
the past 8 years and his fiancée, brother and father all wanted him to be buried there. 
The fact that the mother (who was in her 70s, and did not drive) would find it diffi-
cult to visit her son’s grave was a “weighty factor”,51 but not decisive.
Lifetime Relationships with the Deceased
Despite the emphasis on external factors, Australian courts have occasionally 
selected the person with the closest emotional tie to the deceased. In Keller v Kel-
ler,52 the deceased’s daughter could cremate her remains (fulfilling what were appar-
ently her mother’s wishes), despite objections from the deceased’s son who wanted 
burial in accordance with traditional Jewish law and custom. Hargrave J described 
the daughter as “the child in whom the deceased reposed her principal trust and 
confidence”,53 highlighting the deceased’s failure to tell her son about her cancer 
diagnosis and the fact that she had previously sought a restraining order against him.
In AB v CD54 separated parents disagreed over the funeral arrangements for their 
infant son. The child had lived with his mother who wanted to bury him in a ceme-
tery close to where she was living with her new fiancé; the father (who had had little 
contact with his son) wanted somewhere closer to where the father lived. Harrison 
J refused to be swayed by the arguments around the two different burial sites; in the 
judge’s opinion, the importance of visiting their son’s grave had “been elevated to 
a level that [would] recede with the passing of the years”.55 The key factor was the 
child’s relationship with his mother, which tipped the judicial scales her favour:
[O]ne factor appears to dominate all others. The plaintiff has had the primary 
care and responsibility for her son since birth…[The child] had a large number 
of people in his life who loved him, but his relationship with his mother was 
necessarily unique.
Closer to home, the decision in Re JS (Disposal of Body)56 is underpinned by a simi-
lar rationale. The terminally-ill teenager who wanted to be cryogenically frozen had 
48 This resonates with notions of place attachment, and affective connections to a particular location or 
physical landscape based on symbolic meanings or emotional ties—Altman and Low (1992).
49 [2008] EWHC B3 (Ch).
50 [2008] EWHC B3 (Ch) at [9].
51 [2008] EWHC B3 (Ch) at [24].
52 [2007] VSC 118.
53 [2007] VSC 118 at [18].
54 [2007] NSWSC 1474.
55 [2007] NSWSC 1474 at [62]. This is an unusual statement, given what are typically strong emotional 
attachments to a loved one’s grave—Petersson (2010).
56 [2016] EWHC 2859 (Fam).
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lived with her mother, was refusing all contact with her father, and had not seen 
him since 2008. The close maternal relationship, combined with the “nature of the 
family breakdown and of JS’s wishes”57 were special circumstances for making the 
mother sole estate administrator under s 116 of the Senior Courts Act 1981—and 
allowing her to trigger the cryonics process.
The Deceased’s Wishes
The deceased’s own funeral preferences (if known) can act as a reference point for 
resolving equal kinship disputes,58 despite not being legally binding. These were an 
important part of the factual matrix in Re JS, even if the judge categorised them 
as “relevant, perhaps highly so, but…not determinative”.59 However, the deceased’s 
expressed wish to be buried in his native Jamaica, next to his mother, swayed the 
outcome in Anstey v Mundle60 when two of his three daughters insisted on burial 
in England and the other (supported by the deceased’s niece) favoured repatriation. 
According to Klein J, this was a “particularly weighty factor”,61 and the deceased’s 
extended family (who he was very close to) all supported a Jamaican burial.
Pragmatism Over Principle?
While some trends have emerged, most of these decisions seem to be based on prag-
matism rather than legal principle. Analysing the case law does not reveal a cohesive 
set of rules, because the various judicial rationales have often been applied incon-
sistently. For example, courts might favour a custodial parent in disputes involving 
infants or minors but this practice is by no means universal,62 and diminished levels 
of contact between parent and child are not always determinative.63 Likewise, the 
location of the gravesite and ease of access for future visiting may be more relevant 
in some cases than in others,64 while judges have also been swayed by the organisa-
tion and timing of conflicting funeral arrangements,65 as well as connections (both 
57 [2016] EWHC (Fam) 2859 at [54].
58 Identified as another relevant consideration in Hartshorne v Gardner [2008] EWHC B3 (Ch).
59 [2016] EWHC 2859 (Fam) at [48].
60 [2016] EWHC 1073 (Ch).
61 [2016] EWHC 1073 (Ch) at [45].
62 Contrast AB v CD [2007] NSWSC 1474 and Joseph v Dunne [2007] WASC 238 with Burrows v 
Cramley [2002] WASC 47 and Fessi v Whitmore [1999] 1 FLR 767.
63 Compare AB v CD [2007] NSWSC 1474 with Scotching v Birch [2008] EWHC 844 (Ch).
64 Contrast Burrows v Cramley [2002] WASC 47 with both Joseph v Dunne [2007] WASC 238 and 
Hartshorne v Gardner [2008] EWHC B3 (Ch), though the geographical distance was greatest in the first 
case.
65 See Calma v Sesar (1992) 106 FLR 446, Burrows v Cramley [2002] WASC 47 and Joseph v Dunne 
[2007] WASC 238.
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bad and good) to a proposed burial place.66 The range of factors taken into account 
in each case and the weight attached to them also varies significantly. On the one 
hand, this allows for a uniquely responsive solution—one which recognises that all 
funeral disputes are underpinned by their own distinctive family dynamics and prac-
ticalities. Yet there are drawbacks.
Flexibility and unpredictability are natural bedfellows, and can encourage litiga-
tion between feuding parents or siblings who believe they have nothing to lose in 
applying to court and raising peripheral issues. Meanwhile, other seemingly impor-
tant factors tend to be downplayed. Religious and cultural imperatives are an obvi-
ous example, despite featuring heavily in some of the cases discussed here: the judge 
pointedly ignored them in Calma v Sesar,67 and the issue was side-stepped in Keller 
v Keller68 when the court focused on which child was closer to the deceased. This is 
surprising, given the way in which religious and cultural values shape specific death 
rites, and their prominence in other bodily disposal cases: though not determinative 
in the legal arena, such values are increasingly influential when central to the factual 
narrative.69 Both Calma and Keller contrast sharply, however, with the recent case of 
Abraham v Magistrate Stone, Deputy State Coroner70 where the judge ruled for the 
father in a parental dispute over a teenage boy’s funeral arrangements. Maori culture 
played a prominent role here, with the mother arguing (and the court accepting) that 
burial in ancestral lands was preferable to cremation. However, contemporary Maori 
practices also recognised cremation, and the need for consensus or compromise in 
reaching a decision. The father could cremate his son’s body and divide the ashes 
with the mother, allowing both to arrange culturally appropriate burial services—a 
compromise supported by other family members.
Despite the case law disparities, two things stand out. The first is an apparent 
need to resolve such cases as quickly as possible, and this compressed timeframe is 
repeatedly mentioned, even in disputes involving ashes.71 The second is a reluctance 
66 See Fessi v Whitmore [1999] 1 FLR 767, Scotching v Birch [2008] EWHC 844 (Ch) and Hartshorne v 
Gardner [2008] EWHC B3 (Ch). The various factors can be taken collectively, or in isolation, depending 
on the facts. In Johnson v George [2018] QSC 140, which involved a funeral dispute between eight of the 
deceased’s nine adult children, the court ruled for the applicant son and several of his siblings because 
the deceased had asked to be buried at the location they were proposing and had strong connections with 
that place (one of the deceased’s sons was buried there); burial there would not be expensive or logisti-
cally inconvenient. However, Aboriginal cultural and spiritual beliefs were also important in this case-see 
n 70.
67 (1992) 106 FLR 446.
68 [2007] VSC 118.
69 Though not equal kinship disputes, other Australian cases post-Calma (mostly involving indigenous 
peoples) were more receptive to religious and cultural influences—see Conway (2016), pp 104–107. For 
more recent illustrations, see Darcy and Duckett [2016] NSWSC 1756, Bertani v Bertani [2017] WASC 
78, and the decision of the New Zealand Supreme Court in Takamore v Clarke [2012] NZSC 166.
70 [2017] NSWSC 1684. See also Johnson v George [2018] QSC 140 (discussed at n 66) where Abo-
riginal culture and traditions were a key influence and, in ruling for the applicant son over his respondent 
sister (who was also supported by several other siblings), North J acknowledged that, when it came to the 
funeral of an Aboriginal man, it was customary for a son of the deceased to control the funeral arrange-
ments.
71 See e.g. Leeburn v Derndorfer [2004] VSC 172 and Keller v Keller [2007] VSC 118.
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to decide equal kinship disputes on the basis of close personal ties to the deceased.72 
Isolated examples exist as mentioned above, and the outcome in each seems intui-
tively correct. Yet, judges have gone to great lengths to ensure that decisions should 
not be viewed as a qualitative assessment of ante-mortem relationships between 
the living and the deceased—especially in parental disputes over a dead child. For 
example, Harrison J in AB v CD73 emphasised that the court’s ruling was “not, and 
should not appear to be, a prize for who was the better parent”, sentiments echoed 
by the deputy judge in Hartshorne v Gardner74:
[A] decision between the earnest wishes of two grieving parents requires the 
wisdom of Solomon, which I do not profess to have. Any decision will be hard 
to take for the losing party, but I must make it absolutely clear at the outset that 
the decision I am making involves no criticism of either parent.
For the most part, English and Australian courts avoid delving into family histories 
and conflicting narratives, preferring to separate equal claims using extrinsic factors 
which facilitate a swift resolution. This contrasts sharply with some of the statutory 
frameworks adopted elsewhere, as the following section illustrates.
Statutory Rules for Breaking the Deadlock: Parts of Canada 
and the United States
Other common law jurisdictions have specific legislation for resolving funeral dis-
putes. Most favour a descending order of entitlement, which prioritises the personal 
representative or an individual who the deceased nominated, in a will or other writ-
ten directive, to take charge of the funeral arrangements; this is followed by a sur-
viving spouse (which can include a de facto or cohabiting partner, depending on the 
statute), then children and other specified relatives.75 Some of these statutes also 
contain specific rules for resolving equal kinship disputes, ranging from seemingly 
arbitrary markers on one extreme to more subjective evaluations on the other.
Nominating the Eldest: Selected Canadian Provinces
In British Columbia, s 5(3) of the Cremation, Interment and Funeral Services Act 
2004 states that, in a dispute over the disposition of human remains between persons 
of equal rank, the order of priority should be determined by agreement or (failing 
72 This resonates with the modern approach in family law, where judges are reluctant to declare who is 
a good mother or father in child residence or custody disputes—see nn 111–112 and accompanying text.
73 [2007] NSWSC 1474 at [66].
74 [2008] EWHC B3 (Ch) at [2]–[3].
75 In the Canadian context, see s 5(1) of the Cremation, Interment and Funeral Services Act 2004 
(British Columbia) and s 91(1) of the Funeral Services Act 1999 (Saskatchewan). Numerous examples 
exist in the US—see the statutory provisions noted immediately below, as well as WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 68.50.160 (Washington), COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-34-204 (Colorado) and TEX. HEALTH AND 
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.002 (Texas).
 H. Conway 
1 3
that) in order of age descending from the eldest.76 Similar provisions are in force in 
Alberta77 and Saskatchewan.78 Under each statute, feuding siblings must be adults to 
have decision-making powers, though (perhaps unsurprisingly) no such condition is 
attached to parents of the deceased.79 However, the key factor is that funeral disputes 
between parents or adult siblings are determined solely on the basis of age—and this 
approach appears unique to these three provinces.80
From Majority Preference to Closest Relationship: Selected US States
Unlike other common law jurisdictions, funeral instructions have frequently been 
upheld in the United States of America.81 A number of states now have ‘mortal 
remains statutes’ which apply a default listing of authorised decision-makers only if 
the deceased’s wishes are unknown, unclear or contested82; some also contain spe-
cific rules for settling equal kinship disputes.
Majority Preference: New Jersey
In the state of New Jersey, the emphasis is on ‘majority preference’. When contesting 
the fate of parental remains, N.J. STAT. ANN. 45:27–22 favours “a majority of the 
surviving adult children of the deceased”83; in sibling disputes surrounding a brother 
or sister who died without legally closer kin, the final decision lies with “a majority 
76 However, this is subject to the deceased’s expressed wishes, set out in a will or funeral services con-
tract—2004 Act, s 6.
77 Under s 36(3) of the General Regulation (Funeral Services Act) Alta Reg 226/98 (“the order of prior-
ity begins with the eldest person…and descends in order of age”) and see also ss 11(2)–(3) of the Gen-
eral Regulation (Cemeteries Act) Alta Reg 249/1998.
78 Section 91(2)(b) of the Funeral Services Act 1999 (Saskatchewan) designates the “elder or eldest of 
the persons in the same category” as the “authorized decision-maker”.
79 Perhaps the respective legislatures simply assumed that both parents would usually be adults (the 
number of situations in which two minor parents—or one minor and one adult—have a child who dies 
and a contested funeral would presumably be very small), or were unwilling to deny underage parents a 
say in their child’s funeral arrangements.
80 Though this used to be the approach in the District of Columbia—see n 87. The US Defense Depart-
ment also operated a blanket policy of giving a slain soldier’s remains to the older of their two surviving 
parents, in the event of a conflict between them. As a result, the remains of Army Staff Sgt Jason Hen-
drix, who died in Iraq in 2005, were given to his 48-year-old father instead of his 45-year-old mother—
“Judge Backs Father on Burial of Son Killed in Iraq”, Los Angeles Times, 2 November 2005.
81 Though state dependent, the common law traditionally viewed the wishes of the deceased as para-
mount—see Conway (2016), pp 130–134.
82 The four jurisdictions discussed here are New Jersey, District of Columbia, Minnesota and Pennsyl-
vania, with funeral instructions being prioritised respectively in N.J. STAT. ANN. 45:27–22(a); D.C. 
CODE § 3–413(a); MINN. STAT. § 149A.80, subd 1; and 20 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 305(d)(2). 
As a result, custody of the deceased’s remains will be given either to the nominated individual in the 
deceased’s will, or to the highest ranking relative who will carry out the deceased’s instructions.
83 N.J. STAT. ANN. 45:27–22(a)(2).
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of the [surviving] brothers and sisters”.84 The same legislation simply states that a 
surviving parent or parents control the funeral arrangements for a deceased child.85
In contests between children and in those involving siblings, the age distinction 
may or may not be intentional but has obvious ramifications: the deceased’s minor 
children have no effective input (the legislation refers to “adult” children only), yet 
the same restriction does not apply to the sibling category. As a hypothetical exam-
ple, a 15-year-old son has no legal say in a parent’s funeral arrangements where his 
adult siblings are fighting over this; the same teenager would, however, be able to 
influence the outcome in contests involving a dead sibling.
Subjective Assessments: District of Columbia, Minnesota and Pennsylvania
Legislative provisions in several other US states contemplate a more subjective 
assessment. In the District of Columbia, D.C. CODE § 3–413 imposes a specific 
kinship ranking, and in the case of equal entitlements, favours “the majority of 
the competent adult children” of the deceased with the same rule being applied to 
adult siblings as “surviving competent adult[s]…in the next degree of kindred”.86 
In parental disputes, the legislation simply favours the “surviving competent parent 
or parents of the deceased”.87 Where these fail to produce a decision, D.C. CODE § 
3–413.01 states that conflicts over the deceased’s remains should be determined by 
the following factors:
(1) The reasonableness, practicality and resources available for payment of the pro-
posed arrangements and final disposition;
(2) The degree of the personal relationship between the decedent and each of the 
persons in the same degree of relationship to the decedent;
(3) The expressed wishes and directions of the decedent and the extent to which the 
decedent has provided resources for the purpose of carrying out those wishes or 
directions; and
(4) The degree to which the arrangements and final disposition will allow for par-
ticipation by all who wish to pay respect to the decedent to participate.
Effectively the same legal framework exists in Minnesota under MINN. STAT. § 
149A.80, with the legislative emphasis (once again) on the “degree of the personal 
84 N.J. STAT. ANN. 45:27–22(a)(4).
85 N.J. STAT. ANN. 45:27–22(a)(3). Again, in the case of an adult child, this assumes the absence of 
higher ranking kin, such as a surviving spouse or a civil union or domestic partner.
86 However, in both instances, decision-making powers will be given to less than a majority where 
they have “used reasonable efforts to notify” all other surviving competent adult children and kin of the 
arrangements, and are unaware of any opposition—D.C. CODE § 3–413.
87 Previous laws favoured the oldest adult in each class, except for parental disputes where the father was 
preferred to the mother. However, the latter edict was declared unconstitutional on grounds of gender 
discrimination—Parker v Hornton’s Funeral Service Inc 200 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2001) (father initially pre-
ferred to mother, who was 3 years older).
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relationship” between each individual and the deceased in equal kinship disputes.88 
Both statutes are silent on the meaning of this specific term, and what courts should 
look for. However, it seems to suggest emotional bonds and ongoing interactions, 
implicitly favouring the person who had the closest lifetime connection with the 
deceased.
Finally, in Pennsylvania, there is a notable shift in emphasis. Here, the majority 
view is irrelevant and the relationship between the deceased and each individual is 
the sole, decisive factor. According to 20 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 305(d)(2):
If two or more persons with equal standing as next-of-kin disagree on disposi-
tion of the decedent’s remains, the authority to dispose shall be determined by 
the court, with preference given to the person who had the closest relationship 
with the deceased.89
Again, the legislation does not define what is meant by ‘closest relationship’ and 
its inherent qualities, leaving this interpretative task to the courts. For example, the 
judge in Estate of N.P.90 examined a range of factors including the number of tel-
ephone conversations between the deceased and each protagonist. In In re Estate of 
Weiss91 the contest was between the deceased’s adult sons, one of whom favoured 
cremation in accordance with his mother’s wishes while the other insisted on burial. 
Having acknowledged the “painful and delicate issue”92 before the court, Herron J 
offered the following reassurance:
There is no doubt…that both [sons]…deeply cared for and loved their mother. 
Determining which of [them]…had the “closest” relationship for the purposes 
of section 305 in no way reflects on their love or seeks to judge it.93
Ruling for the first son, Herron J listed certain “objective criteria”94 as evidence that 
the deceased was closer to him—including the fact that the mother had given this 
son power of attorney over her lifetime health and welfare, as well as joint power of 
attorney for her financial affairs.95
89 The same statute also allows for allegations of “enduring estrangement” between the deceased and 
next-of-kin who would otherwise have decision-making authority, defined as a “physical and emotional 
separation from the deceased” which existed for a period of time “demonstrat[ing] an absence of due 
affection, trust and regard for the deceased”—see respectively, 20 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 305(b)-
(c) and § 305(e).
90 22 Fid. Rep. 2d 473 (Berks Cty. O.C. 2002).
91 2009 Philia. Ct.Com. Pl. LEXIS 236 (Oct. 1, 2009) (appeal dismissed without opinion at 2011 Pa. 
Super. LEXIS 1675 (Pa. Super. Ct., Mar. 24, 2011)).
92 2009 Philia. Ct.Com. Pl. LEXIS 236 (Oct. 1, 2009) at [*1].
93 2009 Philia. Ct.Com. Pl. LEXIS 236 (Oct. 1, 2009) at [*3].
94 2009 Philia. Ct.Com. Pl. LEXIS 236 (Oct. 1, 2009) at [*3].
95 Pennsylvania courts have been factoring emotional closeness (and models of good behaviour) into 
funeral disputes, long before the current statutory regime. In Boyd v Gwyn 6 Pa. D. & C. 275 (1925), a 
dispute between a sister and two brothers over their father’s funeral, the court favoured the sister—a duti-
ful and loving child, who intended to bury her father in a family grave in his boyhood home of Nashville. 
Her two brothers had had little contact with their father for almost 20 years and, driven by their animos-
ity towards him, wanted burial in Philadelphia where the deceased had no family or contacts.
88 MINN. STAT. § 149A.80, subd 5. Again, this assumes that a majority view cannot be reached.
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The ‘Right’ Result or the Quickest One?
These statutory frameworks oscillate between two extremes when adjudicating equal 
claims: that of a blunt ranking according to age or majority preference, contrasted 
with emotionally intuitive notions of who had the best personal relationship with the 
deceased. However, each generates its own problems.
With age and majority preference, the emphasis is on finding a quick and decisive 
solution to a complex and difficult issue—the legislative equivalent of cutting the 
Gordian knot. Both are effectively rules of convenience: they allow decisions to be 
made in scenarios where one has to be made, so that the dead can be laid be rest. 
Judges can dispense with individual cases (should the dispute even get this far),96 
without having to probe family hostilities or make value-judgments about prior affil-
iations between the living and the dead.
Looking at the individual markers, an outcome based on majority preference (in 
essence, a form of ‘majority rule’) is superficially attractive. Adopting one of the 
core values of a democratic society resonates with notions of fairness, and ensures 
that some measure of consensus permeates the decision-making process. The 
embedded element of certainty of outcome also makes it a useful mechanism for 
resolving contests between three or more of the deceased’s siblings or children.97 
Yet, there are drawbacks. The most obvious is reaching an attainable majority. Since 
this particular tie-breaker requires a numerical advantage on one side,98 it does not 
work in parental disputes over a dead child99 or where equal numbers of siblings 
are pitched against each other. The fact that the majority can legitimately ignore the 
minority view is also problematic (the so-called ‘tyranny of the majority’), and can 
fuel underlying tensions. Take three siblings, one of whom cared for their elderly 
mother and handled all her personal affairs, while the others were occasional visi-
tors; here, the care-giving sibling would be overruled if the other two insisted on 
specific funeral arrangements, because the nuances of family life are irrelevant. 
Finally, there is the eligibility issue. Each statutory regime only recognises the 
96 Age-based rankings would (presumably) deter litigation because the eldest would automatically suc-
ceed. For an isolated example in Saskatchewan, see Saunders v Saskatoon Funeral Home Company Ltd 
2016 SKQB 217 (post-cremation ashes excluded on the wording of the particular statute; father not enti-
tled to his daughter’s ashes by virtue of being older than the mother).
97 For example, the court’s task in Anstey v Mundle [2016] EWHC 1073 (Ch) (see nn 60–61 and accom-
panying text) would have been much easier—though the outcome very different—since two of the three 
siblings wanted their father buried in England.
98 Assuming there are at least three claimants of equal standing, two or more must agree and be able to 
tip the balance in one side’s favour; for example, two versus two on each side would still result in dead-
lock and there is no concept of a ‘casting vote’.
99 While science has pioneered ‘three parent children’ (see Hamzelou (2016)) this is not reflected in 
current English law where parental status is still based on two individuals. However, there may be situ-
ations in which more than two people have parental authority for a child under s 2 of the Children Act 
1989 (though this would not constitute ‘parent’ for the purposes of intestacy rankings which apply to 
funeral disputes). Significant changes have been introduced elsewhere, which might facilitate a majority 
rule scenario in equal kinship disputes (if this was the applicable tie-breaker); for example, in Ontario, 
the All Families Are Equal Act 2016 recognises up to four parents of a child born to a surrogate or where 
a preconception agreement to parent together was made by up to four people.
 H. Conway 
1 3
deceased’s ‘adult’ children as constituting a potential majority—something which 
could operate unfairly where one of the deceased’s children is a teenager (and, in 
particular, approaching the legal age of adulthood). It seems inherently wrong, for 
example, that a 16-year-old’s views about their parent’s funeral could simply be 
disregarded.100
Where the ranking is based on age, the legal position is clear; if applied, for 
example, to the opening scenario in this article, the 67-year-old brother would have 
succeeded over his 66-year-old sister. Despite influencing aspects of succession 
law,101 the use of this particular determinant is inherently problematic when applied 
to funeral disputes. Age is an arbitrary marker, a mere temporal reference point for 
separating equal claims. The person who succeeds is legitimised by a convenient 
rule of law; but, instead of favouring the oldest,102 why not impose some other ran-
dom benchmark such as who’s the tallest (even more indiscriminate), or who was 
quickest in staking their claim by seeking a formal grant of administration over the 
deceased’s estate or claiming the deceased’s body (slightly less tenuous, though the 
outcome could be just as arbitrary).103 And while a ranking based on gender would 
almost certainly be discriminatory,104 surely the same applies to seniority?105 Yet, 
there is a counter-argument—at least in the sibling context. Age dictates each per-
son’s position and role in the sibling hierarchy; and while birth-order stereotypes 
should always be treated with caution, first-born children tend to carry more respon-
sibility and assume the role of natural leaders.106 Since death literature suggests 
that traditional family hierarchies re-emerge following the loss of a loved one,107 
there is a tentative basis for favouring the eldest sibling here. However, the same 
reasoning breaks down at a number of levels when applied to parental disputes over 
a dead child. The parent–child bond is unique, with strong and enduring emotional 
100 The restriction to ‘adult’ siblings of the deceased in all of the statutes (bar New Jersey) would operate 
in a similar manner.
101 An obvious example is the commorientes rule in England and Wales: where joint tenants die at the 
same time and the order of deaths is unclear, the elder is presumed to die first for estate administration 
purposes under s 184 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (the legal position used to be similar in Scotland, 
under what was then s 31 of the Succession Law Act 1964). Birth order can also influence perceived 
entitlements to personal possessions when siblings are dividing these following the death of a parent—
see Drake (2007).
102 Or ‘older’ in the case of two individuals of equal rank. For convenience this discussion uses ‘oldest’ 
and corresponding adjectives.
103 For example, applying a ‘speed of action’ test to Calma v Sesar (1992) 106 FLR 446 (see nn 33–36 
and accompanying text) would have resulted in the mother succeeding on the first determinant (grant of 
administration) and the father on the second (possession of the body).
104 Prioritising a father over a mother might tap into outdated perceptions of family patriarchy, but would 
constitute gender discrimination (see n 87)—as well as ignoring new variant family forms. See however, 
Johnson v George [2018] QSC 140 as discussed at nn 66 and 70; although dealing with siblings, the out-
come suggests that gender might play a role in specific cultural contexts-though it must be stressed that 
there were other grounds for the court favouring the brother over his sister.
105 In the employment law context, for example, the Equality Act 2010 makes age discrimination unlaw-
ful in the UK.
106 See e.g. Leman (2009) and Emst and Angst (2012).
107 Bowen (1991).
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attachments108 and, in the absence of family breakdown or estrangement, there is 
no innate concept of one parent having preferential status. The death of a child also 
generates much stronger emotions than the loss of a parent or sibling because death 
is contrary to the natural order of things109; and, where disputes occur, the ‘normal’ 
grief response tends to be heightened by what was often an acrimonious end to the 
parents’ own relationship. This makes the ranking of parental claims extremely dif-
ficult, and not something which should be determined by as arbitrary and emotion-
ally insensitive a marker as age. Finally, a blanket seniority rule takes no account of 
conduct. For example, an abusive or a violent parent could still dictate their child’s 
funeral arrangements by virtue of being the older parent.
This contrasts sharply with legislative rankings based on lifetime relationships 
between the deceased and each parent or sibling, of which the Pennsylvania statute 
is the most radical example. Here the emphasis seems to be on getting the right solu-
tion. Emotional closeness has an instinctive appeal, because it recognises and affirms 
close personal ties; it also acknowledges their fluidity, and that different degrees of 
attachment can exist within the same familial cohort. The underlying assumption is 
that the person with the strongest connection to the deceased should be the ultimate 
arbiter in equal kinship disputes, and that the deceased would want them to be. Out-
comes may be difficult to predict, but there is a sense of individualised justice.
At first glance, this particular tie-breaker appears to embrace a family law narra-
tive, reflecting what commentators would view as a ‘functional approach’ whereby 
familial relationships are no longer dictated by formal status but by ongoing interac-
tions and assumed responsibilities.110 This seems apposite given the subject-matter, 
but is not entirely true. First, family law seldom assesses the quality of individual 
relationships, or makes determinations solely on this basis; it prefers a more reflec-
tive approach.111 Child custody cases are an obvious example: decisions are based 
on the ‘best interests of the child’,112 and while judges can consider which parent 
had the closer relationship with the child as part of factual matrix this is one relevant 
factor—it is not the sole determinant. Secondly, family law tends to be forward look-
ing in terms of addressing future needs and ongoing responsibilities,113 as seen in 
child custody and support obligations as well as property redistribution on divorce. 
In contrast, deciding who was closest in equal kinship disputes mandates an entirely 
retrospective inquiry: the court’s sole focus is on past relationships between each 
parent or sibling and the person who is now deceased.
This brings us to the crux of this particular tie-breaker, and what it actually 
contemplates. The Pennsylvania legislation ignores the interpretative and tempo-
ral dimensions of ‘closest relationship’—we assume it denotes emotional bonds 
108 See e.g. Omer et al (2013).
109 Riches and Dawson (1997).
110 See e.g. Glennon (2008) and Atack (2016).
111 For example Bainham (2001) argues that ‘backward looking’ assessments of fault are increasingly 
irrelevant in family law disputes.
112 Pursuant to the welfare of the child principle, and welfare checklist, in s 1 of the Children Act 1989 
in England and Wales.
113 Lowe and Douglas (2015), ch 1.
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and personal interactions, which were ongoing at the time of the deceased’s death. 
In some instances, this might be someone who had a close relationship with the 
deceased in their final months and weeks; in others, it will have been throughout 
the deceased’s lifetime. Much depends on the shifting sands of family relationships. 
Case law suggests a range of factors for assessing how close each parent or sibling 
was to the deceased—for example, the amount of time they spent with the deceased, 
the frequency of contact, and the provision of care and support,114 or the fact that 
the deceased had entrusted a particular individual with responsibility for their legal 
affairs.115 Of course, one might argue that these factors are not necessarily indica-
tive of an emotionally satisfying relationship; some may simply be about discharg-
ing familial duties or geographical proximity if one parent or sibling lived with or 
nearby the deceased. Yet judicially supplied criteria (in whatever form) are essential 
here, not just for definitional clarity, but to mitigate the evidential dangers of self-
serving testimonies and revisionist family histories from warring parents or siblings. 
And it is not just about who loved the deceased more, or vice versa.
Deciding who had the ‘closest relationship’ to the deceased not only raises dif-
ficult normative questions; it also requires judges to be sensitive to the affective con-
tent of different relationships. The court’s function is to evaluate each individual’s 
relationship with the deceased before deciding which tie was the closest or strongest. 
This is not an easy task, and not just because each individual will regard their own 
emotional attachment to the deceased as important. Prioritising one parent or sibling 
on this basis alone requires judges to delve into complex family histories and make 
subjective value-judgments on personal relations between the living and the dead, 
something they have been keen to avoid—and not just in equal kinship disputes. As 
Lord Brodie remarked in C v Advocate General for Scotland116:
Determining what are appropriate funeral arrangements by reference to the 
quality of relationships within a family appears to me a task for which the 
court is quite unsuited.
Judicial unease is not a reason, in itself, for rejecting a closest relationship test; nor 
is the fear of encouraging litigation. The fundamental problem with this particular 
tie-breaker is the long-term impact of the court’s decision. A judgment based on 
closeness is not an emotionally responsive one for the defeated party or parties.117 
Individual outcomes in funeral disputes tend to be seen through the binary lenses 
of winning and losing, but the effect is much more pronounced here: while the vic-
tor can reinforce and perpetuate their relationship with the deceased, the emotional 
consequences are devastating for the parent or sibling(s) who loses because they are 
114 The symbolic value given to care as part of the meaning of ’family’ has been explored elsewhere—
see e.g. Diduck (2011).
115 Deciding factors in Estate of N.P. 22 Fid. Rep. 2d 473 (Berks Cty. O.C. 2002) and In re Estate of 
Weiss 2009 Philia. Ct.Com. Pl. LEXIS 236 (Oct. 1, 2009), as well as Keller v Keller [2007] VSC 118 and 
AB v CD [2007] NSWSC 1474.
116 [2011] CSOH 124 at [67].
117 Law and emotion literature stresses the need for emotional intelligence in the family law arena and 
family contests more generally—see Huntington (2016).
1 3
‘First Among Equals’: Breaking the Deadlock in Parental and…
not deemed to have been as close to the deceased.118 Even if judges are at pains to 
stress that they are not saying which person the deceased loved more (or vice versa), 
decisions will invariably be seen as posthumous and permanent rulings to this effect. 
This will be hard for the ‘losing’ party to come to terms with and could trigger a 
new wave of family resentments.
Judged solely on this basis, a blunt ranking of claims has certain benefits. Both 
age and majority rule eclipse so much of the underlying situation and say nothing 
about the protagonists and their respective relationships with the deceased; they 
are rules of convenience which allow judges to ignore the emotional and contextual 
backdrops.119 However, it is not simply a case of the law abrogating responsibility 
for making difficult decisions. Such value neutral rulings are undoubtedly more effi-
cient (they require less deliberation than a ‘closest relationship’ test), and minimise 
the scope for protracted and bitter disputes between parents or siblings. As McKech-
nie J remarked in Ugle v Bowra & O’Dea120:
There has to be a balance between the need for prompt expedition of a matter 
that involves grief and loss to many people, together with the need to secure 
burial of a person reasonably promptly, and the need for a full exploration of 
disputed matters…Pressures of time, stress and pain add to an already emo-
tional situation where there are no winners and losers, only deeply held and 
legitimate feelings that are exacerbated by uncertainty.
Age or majority preference may be imperfect rules in imperfect settings, but they are 
quick and dispassionate solutions with damage limitation properties. Warring par-
ents or siblings are prevented from using the courtroom as a forum for replaying old 
family feuds; and those who lose may find the outcome easier to accept, knowing 
that it was based on nothing more than a legal rule.
On this basis, age or majority rule might seem preferable to a closest relation-
ship test if choosing between two extremes. Yet, these are not the only options and 
the following section proposes an alternative statutory matrix for resolving equal 
kinship disputes, which draws on the more nuanced schemes in Minnesota and the 
District of Columbia, and could be implemented elsewhere.
118 When presenting this paper at an event, one participant said that, if she and her siblings disagreed 
about their parents’ funeral arrangements, she could cope with losing because she was not the oldest 
child—but not if she wasn’t the closest child.
119 And while the dead should be treated with respect, some might argue that courts should concentrate 
on the living instead of devoting their time to contested corpses or ashes. However, such a rationalist 
stance overlooks the fact that most funeral disputes occur immediately after death when the deceased is 
biologically dead but still very much ‘alive’ in a familial sense—as Lord Brodie remarked in C v Advo-
cate General for Scotland [2011] CSOH 124 at [39], because “someone has died does not mean that he 
is no longer regarded as part of the family”. The final decision will also have a major impact on everyone 
involved as they struggle to come to terms with the loss of a loved one, and the emotional fallout from 
the litigation.
120 [2007] WASC 82 at [1].
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A Customised Alternative
If legislating for equal kinship disputes, both England and Wales and Australia are 
obvious candidates.121 The prevailing common law narrative allows for flexibility, 
but makes for uncertainty as judges are forced to adjudicate on a case-by-case basis 
with little legal guidance. Inconsistent outcomes, alongside other seemingly perti-
nent factors being overlooked or downgraded in individual cases,122 also strengthen 
the argument for a discrete set of guiding principles to assist judges and bring much-
needed clarity to the area.
The starting point in all equal kinship disputes (and in funeral disputes generally) 
should be the deceased’s own funeral instructions. This is already the position in 
British Columbia and in each of the four US states discussed here123; other jurisdic-
tions are contemplating a similar shift in the law,124 while a number of recent Eng-
lish cases are placing greater emphasis on what the deceased wanted.125 Whether the 
expressed wishes of the dead should be paramount, raises issues beyond the scope of 
this paper. However, the fact that many people assume they can decide what happens 
to their mortal remains suggests some sort of normative preference for upholding 
funeral instructions, while the core values of autonomy and self-determination also 
come into play: what we are doing here is respecting ante-mortem choices which 
take effect on death.126 Prioritising the deceased’s wishes in equal kinship disputes 
not only reflects this; it give judges a clear focal point (they simply select the parent 
or sibling intent on carrying out these wishes), and moves the emphasis from the 
warring parties to the person whose corpse or ashes is being contested (similar to 
the child welfare test in custody disputes).127 Of course, an obvious danger is that 
the locus of the dispute shifts to what the deceased’s wishes actually were, though 
this could be countered by insisting on written preferences (for example, in a will, 
pre-paid funeral plan, or personal correspondence such as email exchanges) or clear 
and verifiable oral statements to this effect.128 However, default rules will still be 
121 As are the other jurisdictions mentioned in n 30. And despite the changes contemplated by the Burial 
and Cremation (Scotland) Act 2016, the statute has no specific rules for dealing with equal kinship dis-
putes.
122 As highlighted in the section entitled ‘Pragmatism Over Principle’ above.
123 And in the US more generally—see n 81. In Scotland, s 65 of the Burial and Cremation (Scotland) 
Act 2016 will allow individuals to make an “arrangements on death declaration” (effectively nominating 
a person to carry out their funeral arrangements); this can be upheld by courts, giving some credence to 
funeral preferences.
124 Most notably New Zealand (New Zealand Law Commission (2015), Pt 4) and the Australian state of 
Victoria (see Victorian Law Reform Commission (2016)).
125 See Burrows v HM Coroner for Preston [2008] EWHC 1387 (Admin) for a strong endorsement, as 
well as Anstey v Mundle [2016] EWHC 1073 (Ch) and Re JS (Disposal of Body) [2016] EWHC 2859 
(Fam). From an Australian perspective, see the respective comments in Ugle v Bowra & O’Dea [2007] 
WASC 82 and State of South Australia v Smith [2014] SASC 64.
126 See Conway (2016), ch 5 as well as Nwabueze (2013) and Sperling (2008), ch 4.
127 See e.g. Smart and May (2004)—‘illegitimate’ issues such as parental blame and recriminations are 
eclipsed by the ‘welfare of children’ emphasis in the Children Act 1989.
128 Each parent or sibling might claim that the deceased told them something different, as in the North-
ern Ireland dispute mentioned in the opening paragraph, and Anstey v Mundle [2016] EWHC 1073 (Ch).
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needed in two situations: where the dispute involves a dead infant or minor,129 or in 
adult deaths where the deceased’s own preferences are unspecified or unclear.
But what factors should apply here? The deceased’s religious or cultural beliefs—
insofar as these might influence the choice of funeral arrangements—would seem to 
be an obvious one, as would the deceased’s emotional, spiritual or geographical ties 
to a particular place (in disputes over where to inter the body or scatter the ashes). 
Again the legislative focus would be on the deceased’s own values and attachments, 
not those of the warring siblings or parents. From a more objective stance, the prac-
ticalities surrounding the proposed funeral arrangements are important: these exert 
a huge influence at common law, and are also reflected in the statutory checklists for 
separating equal kinship claims in both Minnesota and the District of Columbia. The 
same statutes also include the degree of personal relationship between the deceased 
and each parent or sibling; while open to criticism as a sole determinant, this might 
be relevant as part of a broader contextual inquiry but with additional safeguards to 
capture negative conduct. For example, courts could look at any enduring estrange-
ment between the deceased and a particular party, as well as past allegations of vio-
lent or abusive conduct (physical or emotional).130 And while the sheer arbitrariness 
of an age-based marker makes it unsuitable, majority preference between feuding 
siblings could be a useful addition to the legislative checklist—as opposed to being 
the sole determinant. However, this should not be confined to adult siblings; when 
disputes arise over the funeral arrangements for a dead parent (or, to a lesser extent, 
dead siblings) there should be scope for taking the views of younger children into 
account where they have strong opinions on the matter. Lowering the age to 16 
would not be controversial,131 and there may even be an argument for allowing input 
from teenagers—those aged 13 or more could be part of the collective for majority 
rule purposes.132 Finally, where separated parents are fighting over dead infants or 
minors, courts could also consider what custody or residence arrangements were in 
place for the child, and why.
These factors would not have any specific weighting, though some might be more 
influential than others in the context of a particular case; and they would only come 
into play if the deceased’s own funeral instructions failed to resolve the issue. What 
is being proposed here is a specialised and facilitative legal solution which is still 
sufficiently adaptable to deal with diverse factual scenarios. A specific frame of ref-
erence would make the law more accessible for feuding parents and siblings, while 
129 Since most children (and many young adults) may not have articulated or even contemplated their 
own funeral preferences, though isolated examples exist—see Burrows v HM Coroner for Preston [2008] 
EWHC 1387 (Admin) (teenage boy who committed suicide had wanted to be cremated) and Re JS (Dis-
posal of Body) [2016] EWHC 2859 (Fam) (dying teenager wanted to be cryogenically frozen).
130 Drawing on the Pennsylvania model—see n 89.
131 Various statutes give decision-making capacity to those aged 16 or over, including s 8 of the Family 
Law Reform Act 1969 which deals with consent to medical or dental treatment. The English Law Com-
mission is also considering whether to lower the age of testamentary capacity from 18 to 16—Law Com-
mission (2017), ch 8.
132 This chimes with child custody disputes in which the views of children (especially older children) 
can be taken into account (in England and Wales, see s 1(3)(a) of the Children Act 1989), and is part of a 
wider trend in family law—see Parkinson and Cashmore (2009).
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allowing effective participation in the legal process (something which does not 
occur when the outcome is dictated solely by age). Judges would still have to assimi-
late the facts and devise an appropriate legal response, but would have clear legisla-
tive guidance—allowing them to reach conclusions expediently, and without getting 
drawn into complex family histories. And, where the default ranking is triggered, a 
bounded set of factors not only limits the judicial zone of inquiry; it prevents both 
sides from raising extraneous issues, and might de-escalate the conflict or at least 
prevent it from spiralling out of control.
This customised statutory alternative may not remove the incentive to litigate 
(something which seems endemic here) or make the final outcome any more pre-
dictable in equal kinship disputes (assuming the deceased’s own funeral instructions 
failed to settled the matter). However, there would be a more coherent, streamlined 
and reflective basis for decision-making than the current common law approach or 
some of the statutory alternatives analysed here.
Conclusion
Family funeral disputes are as sad and inevitable as the deaths which trigger them. 
Set against a backdrop of time constraints and intra-familial turmoil they stir up 
intense feelings of bitterness and acrimony as the emotional ante of the conflict is 
upped by the raw, consuming emotions of death.133 In some respects, funeral dis-
putes are non-justiciable; aside from the inevitable time and expense, they inflict a 
heavy toll on everyone involved (the human cost far outweighs the economic), and 
judges dislike conflicts which delay the disposal of the dead and cannot always be 
settled by discrete legal principles. The final observation is particularly apt where 
the protagonists have equal rights but different views, and the competing interests 
are often finely balanced on each side.
Equal kinship disputes are highly individualistic yet, at the same time, intrinsi-
cally relational: at their core is each person’s connection to the deceased versus their 
own difficult relationships with each other. In many of these cases, the legal contest 
will have its genesis in issues which are unrelated to the seemingly narrow issue of 
funeral arrangements. Feelings and emotions run high as old family grievances and 
latent resentments are aired through the refractive prism of grief. Given the con-
text and sensitivity of the conflict, those involved should be encouraged to reach 
a consensus. However, this is not always possible as arguments and intransigence 
dominate.
Legal intervention becomes inevitable, yet the law also confronts its own limita-
tions here; there is no legal solution that will adequately meet the emotional needs 
of everyone involved because each person will have deeply held and extremely 
personal views on the matter, and the damage inflicted on the warring parents or 
siblings means that the end result will always be something of a Pyrrhic victory. 
What is needed is the best possible legal mechanism to solve the insoluble, and the 
133 Conway and Stannard (2011).
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customised statutory framework suggested here might just achieve that. It still con-
templates an evaluative response, in the sense of choosing one parent or sibling over 
the other(s). Yet, by focusing on the deceased’s own funeral preferences to begin 
with, there is a clear mandate for the court’s decision, embracing what has been 
termed the “modern autonomy trajectory”.134 Failing that, a collective checklist of 
evaluative criteria ensures a multifaceted approach to decision-making but within set 
parameters. These create a containment zone for the conflict—something which is in 
the best interests of everyone involved.
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